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Ricardian Comparative Advantage  
with Intermediate Inputs 
 
 
Alan V. Deardorff 
 
The University of Michigan 
 
 
  This paper examines the role of comparative advantage in a Ricardian trade model with 
intermediate inputs.  The first issue is how to define comparative advantage when there are 
intermediate inputs.  Several definitions are suggested, differing in whether they are based on the 
total costs of producing goods, on the one hand, or on the labor requirements per dollar of value 
added, on the other; and differing also – since both approaches require prices of intermediate 
inputs – in the choice of prices for making these comparisons.  Standard “predictions” of trade 
patterns in terms of comparative advantage are easily derived, but using the value-added 
definition and actual prices that prevail with trade.  These have the usual implications for 
patterns of specialization based on rankings, or “chains,” of comparative advantage.  However, 
because these prices are not given and may depend on barriers to trade, these comparisons are 
less informative than in Ricardian models with only final goods.  In fact, trade patterns here can 
be so sensitive to trade costs that any such comparison predicting the trade in particular goods 
fails to be robust.  In spite of this, the gains from trade are unambiguous in these Ricardian 
models, with imported inputs actually providing an additional source of gain from trade.  Also, a 
weaker statement of the Law of Comparative Advantage, using only a correlation or average 
relationship between relative autarky prices and trade, is also valid under weaker assumptions 
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Ricardian Comparative Advantage  
with Intermediate Inputs
 *  
 
Alan V. Deardorff 
The University of Michigan 
 
 
Here I try to spell out how comparative advantage may be defined, and how it 
operates, in a Ricardian model with intermediate inputs.  The reason for doing this is that 
I have not been able to find this material published elsewhere.
1  In addition, there has 
been increasing interest in recent years, both theoretically and empirically, in the splitting 
of production processes across international locations through outsourcing, foreign direct 
investment, and other means.
2  Thus the role of intermediate inputs in international trade 
seems to be viewed as increasingly important.  A prerequisite to understanding that role 
may be to capture it within our simplest, Ricardian, trade model. 
The role of intermediate inputs in that model, as we will see and as is already well 
known, is relatively straightforward if countries differ only in their labor requirements for 
production of final and intermediate inputs, but do not differ in the input-output 
coefficients that relate inputs to outputs.  In this case Jones (1961) showed quite generally 
                                                 
* I have benefited from conversations with, and comments of, Harry Flam, Juan Carlos Hallak, Henrik 
Horn, and Robert Stern in writing this paper.  This paper was begun while I was visiting at the Institute for 
International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, during the fall of 2002, during which I benefited 
from financial support from Tore Browaldh's Research Foundation. 
1 See Appendix A for review of how previous authors have, and have not, dealt with this topic. 
2 See Deardorff (2001) for my own take on this issue, including in a Ricardian model.  See also Jones 
(2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2002) on the theory, and Hummels et al. (2001) on empirics.  Feenstra 
and Hanson (2003) provide a survey.   5
that standard applications of comparative advantage apply.
3  But without this assumption, 
he and others have found the role of comparative advantage with intermediate inputs 
difficult to pin down.  That is no less true here, but at least we can map out, perhaps more 
completely than before, what can and cannot be said, both when input-output coefficients 
differ and when they do not.  Even when they are the same, trade patterns can be so 
sensitive to trade costs that comparative advantage is less useful than might be supposed 
for delineating trade patterns. 
 
Defining Comparative Advantage with Intermediate Inputs 
The definition of comparative advantage in a Ricardian Model without intermediate 
inputs is straightforward, even if it is often difficult for our students to understand.  A 
country has a comparative advantage in producing a good, relative to some other good 
and compared to some other country, if its relative labor cost is low.  Letting 
c
g a  be the 
amount of labor needed to produce one unit of good g in country c, country c1 has a 
comparative advantage in good g1 relative to some other good g2, compared to another 
country c2, if its labor cost of producing good g1 relative to g2 is lower than that same 






















<  (1) 
By this definition, if these are the only two goods and countries in a world of perfect 
competition, and if trade is either free or restricted (but not perversely subsidized), then 
we have the following familiar implications: 
                                                 
3 This is the assumption made, for example, by Dixit and Grossman (1982) and Sanyal (1983) in applying 
comparative advantage to sort vertical stages of production between countries.  Both assumed, quite   6
•  Trade will necessarily entail c1 exporting g1 and c2 exporting g2. 
•  For trade to be beneficial to the two countries, this must be the pattern of their 
trade.   
•  The size of this total benefit will be larger the more resources (in this case 
labor) each country is able to reallocate into the industry in which it has 
comparative advantage.   
If the numbers of either goods or countries are larger than two, then the same 
definition can be used, as I will verify later here, but the implications of comparative 
advantage are slightly weaker.  With more than two goods, the two goods for which (1) 
holds may both be exported by the same country (in exchange for other goods). And with 
more than two countries, the two countries for which (1) holds may both export or import 
the same good (to or from other countries).  Nonetheless, if two countries do exchange 
two goods with each other under these assumptions, then each country must export the 
good in which it has comparative advantage by the definition above. 
In trade theory we are accustomed to this simple story becoming murkier if costs 
are variable rather than constant.  For then the costs that we compare in (1) will be 
different depending on the context.  Whatever the relative costs may have been in 
autarky, for example, we may find the cost of the exported good rising and that of the 
imported good falling as a result of trade, reducing and perhaps eliminating the relative 
cost advantage identified in (1).  Indeed, in the Heckscher-Ohlin Model with free trade 
and factor price equalization, all costs are the same in the trading equilibrium, and no 
comparative cost advantage can be observed.  If trade is less than free, so that differences 
                                                                                                                                                 
naturally, that one unit of input is needed for one unit of output at every stage.   7
in production costs are necessary in order to overcome tariffs or transport costs, then an 
inequality like (1) will hold for the costs observed in the trading equilibrium, but as a 
predictor of trade it is both trivial and after the fact.   
For these reasons, it is customary to use autarky costs to define comparative 
advantage in variable-cost models.  Autarky costs – because they depend on a country’s 
underlying technology, factor endowments, and tastes but not at all on policies and 
impediments that may influence the trading equilibrium – provide a primitive theoretical 
predictor of the pattern of trade.  The drawback is that autarky costs may be difficult or 
impossible to observe empirically.  But this is not a concern in a theoretical analysis, and 
even in empirical work the problem can be finessed by imposing additional structure so 
as to infer autarky costs from other primitives, such as factor endowments. 
The advantage of a Ricardian Model, one might think, is that we need not worry 
about costs being variable.  But in fact, once we allow intermediate inputs, the same 
problem emerges.  The cost of producing a good depends not just on the labor needed for 
the final stage of its production, but also on the costs of intermediate inputs, and these 
change with trade and with trade policy, if these inputs are traded. 
Consider the cost in country c of producing a good g, one unit of which requires 
input of 
c
hg b  units of each good h, perhaps including good h=g itself.  With 
c
g a  now being 
the amount of c’s labor needed for just the final stage of g’s production, and with 
c
h p  the 
price in units of c’s labor of each good h in country c, the total (labor) cost of good g in 
country c is 









g b p a  (2)   8
A seemingly straightforward extension of (1) to the case of intermediate goods, then, 
















































































∑  (3) 
However, although the a’s and b’s are technological parameters specific to the two 
countries being compared, the prices are not parameters at all.  They are equilibrium 
values determined in markets, and in general they depend on the behavior and policies of 
these and perhaps other countries.  At a minimum, this gives us different definitions of 
comparative advantage depending on which prices are used in (3).  And there is no 
guarantee that any of these definitions will even plausibly explain trade. 
  In the remainder of this section I will specify several different definitions and 
comment briefly on their more obvious properties.  Then in subsequent sections, as I 
explore what can and cannot be said in the Ricardian Model, I will relate the results to 
these definitions in order to see which of them, if any, provide useful implementations of 
the concept of comparative advantage in terms of being able to delineate the patterns of 
trade and the gains from trade.  At the end of the paper I will attempt to conclude which 
of these definitions is most useful. 
 
Comparative Advantage Definition 1  (Direct costs per unit):  Country c1 has a 
comparative advantage in good g1, compared to country c2 and good g2, if 
equation (1) holds. 
 
Comparative Advantage Definition 2  (Total costs per unit at autarky prices):  
Country c1 has a comparative advantage in good g1, compared to country c2 and   9
good g2, if equation (3) holds with prices 
i c
h p  being the autarky prices in the 
respective countries ci=c1,c2. 
 
Comparative Advantage Definition 3  (Total costs per unit at actual prices):  
Country c1 has a comparative advantage in good g1, compared to country c2 and 
good g2, if equation (3) holds with prices 
i c
h p  being the actual prices that prevail 
in the respective countries in the actual trading equilibrium, including actual 
barriers to trade that are both natural (e.g., transport costs) and artificial (e.g., 
tariffs). 
 
Comparative Advantage Definition 4  (Total costs per unit at undistorted – i.e., 
free-trade – prices):  Country c1 has a comparative advantage in good g1, 
compared to country c2 and good g2, if equation (3) holds with prices 
i c
h p  being 
the prices that would prevail in the respective countries in a free-trade 
equilibrium, with actual natural barriers to trade but no artificial ones. 
 
Comparative Advantage Definition 5  (Total costs per unit at frictionless free 
trade prices):  Country c1 has a comparative advantage in good g1, compared to 





i =  being the world 
prices in a frictionless free-trade equilibrium – that is, the price that would prevail 
in all countries if there were no costs of trade whatsoever, neither natural nor 
artificial. 
   10
The first of these definitions is by far the simplest, and it has the advantage that, 
by not requiring prices at all, it does not depend on which prices are used.  On the other 
hand, it completely ignores all information about the technology for using intermediate 
inputs, and it therefore seems unlikely to be of much use. 
The rest of the definitions all build on the comparisons in equation (3), using the 
same technological parameters in each case but using different prices.  With autarky 
prices, the definition depends only on primitives of the separate countries, and in fact in 
the Ricardian model these autarky prices depend only on the production parameters of the 
country, so this may seem the obvious extension of (1) to the case of intermediate goods.  
However, as we will see, it misses what can be a very important way that intermediate 
inputs and comparative advantage interact:  A country may export a good whose autarky 
cost is relatively high if it can replace a high-cost input with a cheaper one imported from 
abroad.  As McKenzie (1954, p. 179) observed, “A moment’s consideration will convince 
one that Lancashire would be unlikely to produce cotton cloth if the cotton had to be 
grown in England.”  It is this possibility that suggests that some of the other definitions 
listed above may be useful.  I will explore this possibility further later on. 
As will become apparent later, definitions based on (3), even though they may 
seem like obvious extensions of (1), do not turn out to be as meaningful as one might 
have hoped.  The ratios in (3) compare the labor costs per unit of producing goods.  An 
alternative approach that turns out to work better compares the labor required for 
activities, and focuses on the value added in those activities rather than on units of goods. 
That is, consider the activity in a country of producing any good, intermediate or 
final, using whatever intermediate inputs are required for its production in that country.    11
As before, the labor required for that activity is 
c
g a  per unit of the good.  But the value of 
that activity, and thus the labor required per unit of value added, depends also on the 
price of the good, the prices of all required intermediate inputs, and the quantities of 









g b p p v ∑ − =  (4) 
The labor required per dollar of value added in the activity of producing good g from 
intermediate inputs is then 






= α  (5) 
  If we now express comparative advantage in terms of activities and their values 
added, we would say that country c1 has a comparative advantage in (the last stage of 
































































or, expressing value added in terms of prices and labor requirements, if 
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1  (6’) 
  As a definition of comparative advantage, when spelled out fully in (6’), this 
looks daunting, but the comparison that it makes – of labor required per unit of value 
added – is really quite straightforward.  It is true that the expression for value added is 
cumbersome, but not much more so than the calculation of total costs of goods in (3).  
And like (3), it acknowledges that comparative advantage depends not only on direct 
labor cost, but also on the costs and quantities of required inputs.  The difference is that   12
the role of the latter is now viewed not as a component of cost, but rather as a deduction 
from the benefit, or value created by an activity.  Again, however, whether this is a more 
useful formulation of comparative advantage than (3) will depend on what implications 
may be derived from it.  That will be the subject of the rest of the paper. 
  Also like (3), the definition of comparative advantage in (6) requires not just 
technological parameters but also prices, and these prices can be selected in various 
ways.  Analogous to Definitions 2-5, these prices can come from autarky, from free and 
frictionless trade, or from somewhere in between.  I therefore name the following 
definitions, the details of which can be filled in by analogy to Definitions 2-5, but using 
relationship (6): 
Comparative Advantage Definition 2v  (Total costs per value added at autarky 
prices) 
Comparative Advantage Definition 3v  (Total costs per value added at actual 
prices) 
Comparative Advantage Definition 4v  (Total costs per value added at 
undistorted – i.e., free-trade – prices) 
Comparative Advantage Definition 5v  (Total costs per value added at 
frictionless free trade prices) 
 
The Basic Implication of Comparative Advantage 
Consider now a world with any numbers of countries,  C c ... 1 = , and of goods, 
G g ... 1 = .  All are produced with labor and, possibly, intermediate inputs of any or all 
goods.  Production of one unit of good g in country c requires direct input of 
c
g a  units of   13
labor and intermediate inputs of 
c
hg b  units of good  G h ... 1 = .  The actual price of each 
good g in country c is 
c
g p , and at those prices, the value added per unit of good g is as 
given in (4).  The wage in any activity divides this value added across the labor required.  
Thus, with perfect competition, the wage in country c is 





c a v w / max =  (8) 


















1 ≥ =  (9) 
If country c’s producers would actually make a loss producing  2 g , then I will say that 
country c strictly does not produce  2 g , and the inequality in (9) becomes strict.  








































1  (10) 

























If we now compare two countries, one of which produces  1 g  and the other  2 g , 
we have the following proposition, which holds regardless of whether the countries are 
trading freely or not: 
                                                 
4 Note that this comparison and those that follow from it below do not require that trade be balanced.   14
Proposition 1:  If country  1 c  produces  1 g  and strictly not  2 g , and if another country 











































<  (12) 










































<  (12') 
What this says is that what a country produces – and thus its trade – depends as 
always on its direct unit labor requirements in production of goods, a, compared to those 
of other countries.  But now it also depends on the quantities of intermediate goods that 
the countries require in production, as these are embodied in the value-added terms, v.  
The v’s depend negatively on these intermediate input requirements, so the ability to 
produce with a small quantity of an intermediate input will contribute to a large v, a low 
a/v, and hence the ability to produce the final good competitively.  However, as is clear in 
the definition of value added (4), the importance of a particular intermediate input 
requirement bhg also depends on the price of the input h.  A small intermediate input 
requirement does not contribute much to lowering comparative cost if the price of that 
input (in all countries) is also small. 
Proposition 1 says that, of the various definitions of comparative advantage put 
forth earlier in the paper, the one that accurately conforms with the pattern of trade is 
Definition 3v.  That is, we need to compare costs per dollar of value added, not costs per 
unit, in order to infer the pattern of trade, and furthermore this value added needs to be 
calculated at the actual prices that prevail in the trading equilibrium.  As will be discussed 
later, this is not ideal, for a theory that is supposed to predict the pattern of trade.   15
 
Chains of Comparative Advantage 
As in the case without intermediate inputs, Proposition 1 can, in the following 
special cases, be used to identify patterns of specialization on the basis of “chains” of 
comparative advantage.  For any two countries, for example, and with many goods, the 
goods can be ranked in order of the ratios in (12') to produce such a “goods-chain.”  That 
is,  
 
Corollary 1 (Goods Chain of Comparative Advantage):  Let there be G goods 
produced by either or both of two countries,  c1 and c2.
5  Suppose that the goods 
have been numbered in order of country c1’s comparative advantage relative to 






































≤ ≤ ≤  (13) 
 
Sort the goods into three groups that (I) are produced strictly only by country 1, 
(II) are, or with zero profit could be, produced in both countries, and (III) are 
produced strictly only in country 2.  Then group I must lie to the left of group II in 
this chain, and group III must lie to the right.  If there are any goods in group II, 
the ratios of (13) are the same for each of them. 
 
Similarly, using (12), we can also produce a “country chain” of comparative 
advantage for any pair of goods: 
 
Corollary 2 (Country Chain of Comparative Advantage):  Let there be C 
countries, all of which produce either or both of two goods,  g1 and g2.
6  Suppose 
                                                 
5 If there are only two countries, then this covers all goods.  If there are more than two countries, then this 
excludes goods that are strictly not produced in either, about which this particular chain says nothing. 
6 Analogous to footnote 5, if there are only two goods, then every country must produce at least one of 
them, and this covers all countries.  But if there are more than two goods, then this excludes countries that 
produce neither of these and, again, this chain tells us nothing about them.   16
that the countries have been numbered in order of their comparative advantage in 





































≤ ≤ ≤  (14) 
 
Sort the countries into three groups that (I) produce good 1 and strictly do not 
produce good 2, (II) either do, or with zero profit could, produce both goods, and 
(III) produce good 2 and strictly do not produce good 1.  Then group I must lie to 
the left of group II in this chain, and group III must lie to the right.  If there are 
any countries within group II, the ratios of (14) are the same for each of them. 
 
 
To the extent that the ratios in (13) and (14) can be taken as given, these two 
corollaries go about as far as one could hope toward predicting patterns of specialization 
and trade.  Only the dividing lines between groups within these chains, between goods 
exported and imported by country c1 (in (13)), or between countries exporting and 
importing good g1 (in (14)), remain to be determined by relative sizes of countries and 
demands for goods.  Likewise, whether goods are traded at all or not – the latter implying 
that the countries produce goods in common – depends on trade barriers. 
But the chain results are less useful than they may appear, because of the presence 
of actual prices in the definition of v, and thus in the ratios that are compared in (12), 
(13), and (14).  Even if these prices are common across countries, as they will be in the 
special case of free and frictionless trade in all goods, they are still endogenous to a 
trading equilibrium and are therefore not primitives of the model, from which one would 
like to be able to predict patterns of trade.  They can only be known within the trading 
equilibrium, and once that equilibrium is observed, prediction of trade patterns is no 
longer necessary.  Furthermore, in most cases of interest (e.g., reality), trade is not free 
and frictionless.  Therefore these prices differ across countries for a whole variety of   17
reasons, including policies that may be intended to influence the pattern of trade.  This 
makes predictions on the basis of these ratios even more problematic.   
Nonetheless, there are several special cases that are of interest, in some of which 
the role of these prices is neutralized, and these cases may be useful if only as 
benchmarks.  I turn next to these special cases. 
 
Special Cases 
Final Goods, Free Trade:  First, suppose that there are no intermediate inputs at all, or 




g p v = .  




g p p = , then (12) reduces to (1) 
above, the standard expression for Ricardian comparative advantage.
7  Thus, for example, 
the presence of intermediate inputs in the larger economy does not undermine the strong 
implications of Ricardian comparative advantage for pairs of industries that do not use 
them. 
Identical Intermediate Input Requirements, Free Trade:  Second, suppose there 
do exist intermediate inputs, but that the two countries share the same intermediate input 
requirements for the two goods being compared.  Then if all
8 prices are the same due to 
free and frictionless trade (including trade in the intermediate inputs), it follows that the 
v’s are the same in the two countries and they cancel out in (12).  Thus once again, 
comparative advantage depends only on the direct labor requirements, as in (1). 
                                                 
7 In fact, as is well known, if there are no intermediate inputs, then (9) holds even in the presence of non-
negative trade barriers, so long as c1 exports g1 to c2, c2 exports g2 to c1, and one of the countries strictly 


















c a w a w ≥ , with strict inequality in one of these.  Dividing the first by the second yields (1).   18
Identical Intermediate Input Requirements, Restricted Trade:  On the other hand, 
even if intermediate input requirements are the same, the presence of trade costs and 
trade barriers can cause them to matter differently for costs and thus to alter comparative 
advantage as reflected in these ratios.   For example, a country with a relatively low direct 
labor requirement for producing a good may fail to have a comparative advantage in that 
good if trade barriers cause the cost of an intermediate input to be high.  I will illustrate 
this possibility with an example later in the paper. 
Non-Identical Intermediate Input Requirements, Free Trade:  Finally, in what 
may seem the most natural extension of Ricardian comparative advantage to the presence 
of intermediate inputs, we can assume free and frictionless trade together with 
international differences in intermediate input requirements.  That is, just as countries 
differ in the productivity with which they convert labor into goods, they may also differ 
in their productivity of converting intermediate inputs into outputs.  Then comparative 
advantage can derive just as well from a country having low intermediate input 
requirements for a particular good as from requiring a relatively small amount of labor.   
Suppose, for example, that a country is unusually adept at avoiding waste of the 
raw material from which a product is made.  It could then have a comparative advantage 
in that product as a result, even if it requires a somewhat larger relative direct input of 
labor.  The same could be true for a country that needs smaller inputs of, say, energy, due 
perhaps to a favorable climate. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 Actually, identical prices are needed only for the two goods being compared and their respective inputs.   19
Input Requirements versus Labor Requirements 
There is one difference, however, between the role of intermediate inputs and the 
role of labor in determining comparative advantage.  With labor, the absolute requirement 
is immaterial for the viability of a sector, since a large absolute requirement can be offset 
by a low wage.  That, in fact, is why trade depends on comparative advantage rather than 
absolute advantage.  But to the extent that the inputs themselves are tradable, no such 
offsetting domestic price adjustment may be possible for a country in a sector that is, say, 
wasteful in its application of intermediate inputs.  Such waste could put it at a 
disadvantage in all sectors, even if direct labor requirements are low.  This would also 
require a fall in its labor´s wage in order to compensate and create comparative advantage 
in some sectors.  And if sufficiently extreme, high input requirements may cause the 
value added in one or more sectors to be negative at world prices, so that no reduction in 
the wage will be enough to create comparative advantage in those particular sectors.   
It may seem (as it seemed to me, briefly) that this could happen in all sectors, 
making it impossible for a country to compete in any of them.  If so, that would be an 
important difference from the Ricardian model without intermediate inputs, where a 
country must always have a comparative advantage in at least one good, which it can 
exploit if its wage is low enough.  That is, looking at the definition of 
c
g v  in (4), what if a 
country’s input requirements 
c
hg b  are so large, and/or the output prices 
c
g p  are so small, 
perhaps due to free trade with lower-cost countries, that  0 <
c
g v  for all g?  That would 
seem to mean that the entire economy would fail to be viable at all at those prices, and 
perhaps that cutting itself off from free trade would be the only way to survive.   20
In fact, this cannot happen in equilibrium if the input-output technology permits 
production at all, even in a closed economy.  According to Gale (1960), a “productive” 
economy must have the matrix 
1 ) (
− − B I  be non-negative in order for it to be possible to 
use up smaller amounts of goods as inputs than are produced as output, where B is the 
matrix of the economy’s input-output coefficients 
c
hg b  as defined in (4) above.
9  Thus, 
letting v and p be (row) vectors of country c’s value added and prices, (4) becomes 
  ) ( B I p v − =  (16) 
and thus 
  p B I v = −
−1 ) (  (17) 
For a productive economy in the sense of Gale, then, v < 0 requires p < 0 as well.  Thus, 
as long as prices are non-negative, value added per unit cannot be negative for all goods.  
Instead, there must be at least one good for which production is viable in a productive 
economy that faces any given nonnegative prices p. 
Gains from Trade 
Indeed, this same condition – that the economy be “productive” or 
1 ) (
− −B I be 
nonnegative – also assures that there are gains from trade, which in the Ricardian Model 
simply means that the real wage rises with trade.  Let w ˆ  be the (scalar) wage in autarky 
and  p ˆ  the vector of autarky prices, with corresponding ) ( ˆ ˆ B I p v − = .  Since all goods are 
produced in autarky, we must have  g a v w g g ∀ = / ˆ ˆ , while (8) implies that  g a v w g g ∀ ≥ / i n  
                                                 
9 See Gale (1960, p. 297).  To see this, let X and Y be row vectors of gross and net outputs, respectively.  
Then  B X X Y ′ − = , and thus  X B I Y = ′ −
−1 ) ( .  That is, the rows of 
1 ) (
− ′ − B I  – and thus the 
columns of 
1 ) (
− − B I  – are the gross outputs needed to produce a net output of one unit of each individual 
good. These must be nonnegative for viability as a closed economy.   21
any trading equilibrium.  Together these imply  w v w v g g / ˆ / ˆ ≥ , which can be arranged, 





























Expressed in terms of the vectors of prices,  p ˆ  and  p  (since w ˆ  and ware scalars), this is 














If 0 ) (
1 ≥ −















That is,  g p w p w g g ∀ ≥ ˆ / ˆ / , and the real wage is at least as high with trade as without, in 
terms of every good.  In addition, these  inequalities are strict for every good that is 
strictly not produced in the trading equilibrium, and they may in fact be strict for goods 
that are produced as well, if cheap imported intermediate inputs lower their prices 
compared to autarky. 
   22
Proposition 2 (Gains from Trade):  In the Ricardian Model, the wage of labor is at 
least as high in terms of every good with trade as it is in autarky.  It is also strictly 
higher for goods that are themselves strictly not produced in the trading 
equilibrium, and also for goods that use positive amounts, directly or indirectly, of 
inputs that are themselves strictly not produced.  That is, 
 









= ≥  (21) 
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Proof:  (21) follows from (20).  For (22), first note that 
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where the last inequality uses (21) and the last equality uses (23). 
  Similarly for (22b), suppose that for some h1, 0
1 > g h b  and 
1 1 ˆ / ˆ / h h p w p w > , 










































































where again the last inequality uses (21) and the last equality uses (23).   
  This is a stronger result than we find in the textbook, 2-good, Ricardian Model 
without intermediate inputs.  There, with specialization, the real wage rises in terms of 
one good – the one that is not produced – but not in terms of the other.  The result here is 
stronger:  the real wage rises in terms of goods that continue to be produced, and perhaps 
in terms of all goods if the use of intermediate inputs is sufficiently ubiquitous.  The 
reason is illustrated in the two panels of Figure 1. 
  In both panels, the axes measure net output of goods – two of them in panel A and 
three in panel B.  In both, the points labeled T  and the solid lines connecting them mark 
the extremes of the (linear) transformation curve or surface.  In panel A, each of the two 
goods is assumed to be required as an input to the other, so that the maximum net output 
of either (achieved by devoting all labor to its production) requires a negative net output 
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of the other.  In panel B, goods 1 and 2 are only final goods, while good 3 is a required 
intermediate input to production of both of them.   
  Autarky requires production of all goods and thus operation on the interior of the 
transformation curve or surface, T, within the positive orthant.  Defining one unit of labor 
as the labor endowment, the intercepts of T measure the autarky wage in units of each 
good,  g p w ˆ / ˆ , as shown. 
  With trade, producers respond to prices that are different from autarky, 
maximizing the nominal wage at one of the extremes of T, Q (or perhaps, in panel B, 
along one of its edges).  Consumption takes place within the positive orthant on the new 
price line or plane, P, passing through the production point Q.  In both cases, this permits 
an increase in consumption of both goods 1 and 2, and in panel B of good 3 as well.  The 
real wages with trade are identified as the intercepts of the price line or plane, P, with the 
axes,  g p w/.  
  In the example of panel A,  1 / p w  rises with trade because good 1 is strictly not 
produced.  At the same time,  2 / p w  also rises, even though good 2 is produced, because it 
is produced with the now cheaper input of good 1.  The same is true in panel B, except 
that now it is a third good, 3, that serves as the cheaper input for both final goods. 
 
I have discussed the model as though intermediate inputs are traded.  However, 
Propositions 1 and 2 hold just as well with nontraded inputs as with traded ones.  The 
difference is that now a country’s price of an input is likely to become an important 
determinant of comparative advantage.  If a nontraded input is not produced but merely 
available as an endowment, then abundance will cause it to be cheap and the value added   25
in industries that use it will be relatively high, thus contributing to comparative 
advantage.  On the other hand, if nontraded inputs are produced from labor like any other 
good, then comparative advantage in sectors that use them will come to depend in part on 
the country´s labor requirements for producing such inputs.
10  It is this fact, together with 
the fact that the tradability of most inputs is to some extent a policy choice, that prevents 
us from going much further in formulating comparative-advantage-based predictions of 
trade patterns that are both robust and precise, even in the Ricardian Model, as I now 
show. 
 
Impossibility of a Fixed Chain of Ricardian Comparative Advantage 
  Corollary 1 seems to say that, if there are only two countries in a Ricardian world, 
then we should be able to rank goods by comparative advantage and predict patterns of 
trade and specialization with some confidence.  In fact, we cannot, if we want the same 
chain to predict trade patterns independently of whatever barriers to trade may happen to 
exist.  That is, just as is known to be true in the Heckscher-Ohlin Model,
11 the 
combination of intermediate inputs and trade barriers renders any fixed chain of 
comparative advantage invalid as a predictor of trade. 
To see this in the Ricardian Model, consider a relatively simple case in which two 
countries produce and trade four goods, of which two are final goods and two serve only 
as inputs to the respective final goods.  To fix ideas, we may call the final goods cloth (C) 
and autos (A), and the inputs to them respectively wool (W) and steel (S).  Suppose that 
                                                 
10 In the latter case, there is little purpose served by continuing to interpret an input as a separate good.  Its 
production might as well have been subsumed within the technologies of final goods.  Or at least, that is the 
case if the input is nontradable, as well as nontraded.  For other inputs, whether they are traded or not may 
depend on market conditions, in which case maintaining their separate identity is critical.   26
production of one unit of cloth uses one unit of wool and production of an auto uses one 
unit of steel, with no other intermediate inputs required for any of the goods.  Then let the 
direct unit labor requirements for producing these four goods in two countries, 1 and 2, 
be as follows: 











Country 1  1  2  3  4 
Country 2  4  3  2  1 
 
  If trade is free and frictionless in all four goods, then since intermediate input 
requirements and prices are the same in both countries, the v’s cancel out of (13) above 
and we can apply the goods-chain proposition using the ratios of only the direct unit labor 
requirements in the table.  Clearly, country 1’s greatest comparative advantage is in wool, 
second in autos, third in cloth, and last in steel.  It will therefore surely produce and 
export wool, and it will import steel, with the trade in autos and cloth depending on 
country size.  If neither country is too large relative to the other, then country 1 will 
export autos as well as wool, and import cloth as well as steel.  The chain of comparative 
advantage seems to be working just fine, using the ratios from the table: 1/4, 2/3, 3/2, and 
4/1. 
  But now suppose that prohibitively large trade barriers exist for both intermediate 
inputs, wool and steel, so that they become nontraded.   A country that produces autos 
must then produce its own steel, and a country that produces cloth must produce its own 
wool.  Production of the required input can then be thought of as integrated with that of 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 See Deardorff (1979).   27
the final good, and the four-good model reduces to a familiar two-good Ricardian case 
with the following direct-plus-indirect unit labor requirements: 
Final Goods  Direct-plus-






Country 1 2+4=6  3+1=4 
Country 2 3+1=4  2+4=6 
 
Evidently, country 1 now has its comparative advantage in cloth, not autos, and the trade 
in autos and cloth is the reverse of that above. 
  The point of this is not just that trade barriers matter for the pattern of trade, 
which of course they do, here in a rather extreme way.  The point is further that there 
cannot exist a single ranking of the goods in terms of any notion of comparative 
advantage that will predict their trade in the same sense as the Corollaries above.  For any 
ranking that puts cars to the left of tables – and would therefore be consistent with the 
pattern of trade in these two goods when all goods are traded freely – would rank them 
incorrectly for the trade pattern that arises when the intermediate inputs are not traded.   
Of course, if we always knew which goods were tradable and which were not, 
then we could always use direct-plus-indirect unit labor requirements for the former in 
ranking by comparative advantage.  But the tradability of goods depends on the sizes of 
trade barriers, and implicit in the above example is the fact that trade patterns can depend 
so critically on these barriers that no ranking of comparative advantage can predict trade 
independently of those barriers. 
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What Can Be Said? 
This is a familiar problem, for it arose in the Heckscher-Ohlin Model in Deardorff 
(1979).  Because of it, I opted in Deardorff (1980) for expressing the role of comparative 
advantage by means of a correlation between autarky prices and trade flows.
12  Such a 
result can be established here: 
Proposition 3:  Consider a Ricardian economy that trades at prices p, with vectors of 
(gross) production X, inputs N, and final consumption C, so that its net output is 
X–N and its net exports are T=X–N–C.  Then the value at autarky prices  p ˆ  of its 
trade, if  p p ˆ ≠ , must be negative: 
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Proof:  Consider first the value of net output.  It is shown in Appendix B that 
  ) (
ˆ
) ( ˆ g
g
g g N X p
w
w
N X p − = ′ − ′ ∑  (26) 
Now use (22) to interpret the value of consumption: 
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by balanced trade.
13     
                                                 
12 The same correlation result was shown by Dixit and Norman (1980, p. 94). 
13 This actually assumes free trade, as well, since p is serving as both domestic and world prices in the 
trading equilibrium.  As in Deardorff (1980), nonnegative trade barriers can easily be incorporated.   29
This result is the same as that in Deardorff (1980), but it requires fewer 
assumptions here than it did there.  In a more general model with variable costs, such a 
correlation result depends not only on producers maximizing the value of the country’s 
output, as they do here implicitly in (8), but also on demand not changing between 
autarky and free trade in such a way that demand expands even more than output in 
expanding sectors.  In the Ricardian model, because the economy completely specializes, 
this is not an issue.   
Figure 2 illustrates this, for simple 2-good economies without intermediate inputs.  
Panel A, on the left, shows autarky and trade equilibria with variable costs, while panel B 
shows the same for a Ricardian economy.  In each, the transformation curve is TT, and 
autarky equilibrium is at the point labeled  C X ˆ ˆ = , with autarky price line P ˆ .  With free 
trade at the price P, production moves to point X, the economies both increasing their 
output of good X1.  In panel A, without any further assumption on demand, consumption 
could move either to point C or point C'.  At C', however, the value of consumption at 
autarky prices is below the value of production, and indeed the country imports good X1 
in spite of its comparative advantage.  To rule this out in Deardorff (1980) I assumed the 
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Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference applied to consumption of the country as a whole, 
which in effect forced the country to behave like a single consumer and prevented an 
outcome like C'.
14  But in the Ricardian case of panel B, this is not necessary, since the 
linear technology leads the country to the corner solution of producing only X1 and 
nothing of X2.  In that case, consumption with trade (so long as both goods are consumed 
at all), must be worth more at autarky prices than production, and the country must export 
X1.  It turns out, as the proof above demonstrates since it requires no assumption about 
demand, that this same property holds in a Ricardian model with any number of goods as 
well as with intermediate inputs. 
Does this weakened assumption matter?  Perhaps not.  The obvious reason for 
something like the Weak Axiom to be violated by a country’s aggregate consumption is 
for trade to redistribute income among groups with different preferences, or among 
groups with different incomes if preferences are not homothetic.
15  Yet in a Ricardian 
model, income derives only from labor, which is paid the same in every industry.  So it is 
hard to see how such redistribution could occur. 
It may also be worth noting the role of gains from trade in generating this result.  
The proof in Deardorff (1980) proceeded in two steps, the first being to show the gains 
from trade, and then from that to infer the correlation.  In effect the same is true here, 
since the crucial inequality in (27) stems from the comparison of real wages in (22).  
Thus, even though we need no assumption about preferences here, the tendency for a 
                                                 
14 Without that, consumption at C' may be possible if the move from autarky to trade shifts income toward 
consumers who have a greater preference for good X1.  For example, in the Heckscher-Ohlin Model, if 
owners of the two factors have different preferences, the change in goods prices from autarky to free trade 
will also change factor prices and redistribute income from one group to the other.  If owners of the factor 
used intensively in producing good X1 also have a greater preference for consuming it, then movement of 
consumption to a point like C' can occur. 
15 See footnote 12.   31
country to export goods in which it has a comparative advantage continues to be 
intimately linked with the gain from doing so. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has examined the role of comparative advantage in a Ricardian trade 
model with intermediate inputs.  A variety of definitions of comparative advantage 
suggest themselves, most of which require the use of prices to evaluate the roles of 
intermediate inputs.  These prices could in principle be taken from any of several actual 
or hypothetical equilibria.  The definition that provides the strongest predictions of trade, 
in the form of chains of comparative advantage, compares labor per unit of value added, 
with value added based on prices that actually prevail in the trading equilibrium. 
Unfortunately, these actual prices depend crucially on prevailing barriers to trade, 
so much so that, without knowledge of these barriers, comparative advantage cannot 
necessarily even predict the pattern of trade in a pair of goods between a pair of 
countries.  The best that seems to be possible, even in the simplified world of Ricardian 
assumptions, is a correlation of trade patterns with autarky prices.  Thus only an average 
relationship between comparative advantage and trade seems to be at all robust. 
In spite of this, the gains from trade are unambiguous in these Ricardian models, 
with imported inputs actually providing an additional source of gain from trade.  And the 
weaker correlation version of the Law of Comparative Advantage turns out to be valid 
under slightly weaker assumptions than in more general models. 
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Appendix A:  Previous Literature 
 
  Haberler (1936) devotes a chapter to the Theory of Comparative Costs, most of 
which is describing what we now call the Ricardian model.  However, although he goes 
well beyond the two-good case to consider multiple goods, transport costs, and variable 
costs of production, he does not allow for intermediate inputs. 
Viner (1937) also devotes his penultimate chapter to Comparative Costs, although 
he uses the heading Gains from Trade, which may be indicative of what he cares about.  
He devotes lots of attention to who said what and to who made errors – or not – and he 
extends the theory to multiple countries as well as the extensions mentioned by Haberler.  
But again, there is no mention of intermediate inputs.  
Graham (1948) deals extensively with the Ricardian structure, carefully exploring 
extensions in all manner of directions, but even his chapter VIII, “Relaxation of 
Assumptions in the Approach to Reality,” fails to mention intermediate inputs. 
McKenzie (1954) is mostly about showing that an efficient allocation can be 
attained with competitive prices.  He does this in the model of Graham (1923), which he 
points out has (and can have, for its purpose) no intermediate inputs.  McKenzie does 
however discuss the importance of intermediate inputs, pointing out that if they are traded 
they both expand production possibilities and may alter what a country exports.  He also 
points out that the justification for fixed coefficients, which otherwise might be based on 
Samuelson´s (1951) non-substitution result, disappears once intermediate inputs are 
traded and thus have different prices.  Thus, he says, “as soon as trade in intermediate 
products is allowed, the problem loses its special simplicity, and we may as well allow 
joint production and many factors in each country.” (p. 179) 
Jones (1961) derives a condition for efficient assignment of countries to goods in 
a many-good, many-country Ricardian model.  The condition is to minimize the product 
of countries’ unit labor requirements.  He considers the possibility of traded intermediate 
inputs, and is able to extend this same result in their presence (using direct labor 
requirements only), but only under the assumption that all countries share the same 
intermediate input coefficients. 
Amano (1966) shows by example why general results are so difficult with 
intermediate inputs.  With two countries and three goods, holding constant the ranking of 
comparative advantage across the goods, he shows two situations in which the pattern of 
trade in two of the goods is reversed.  Although he does not say so, implicitly the two 
countries do not share identical intermediate input coefficients. 
Jones (1980) makes a point that is made here as well: patterns of comparative 
advantage depend necessarily on prices.  Indeed, in a footnote (p. 240) he describes his 
earlier frustration in trying to find a criterion for comparative advantage in a Ricardian 
model with intermediate inputs that would not include prices.  Undoubtedly, Amano´s 
counterexample arises because prices matter, and are endogenous. 
  Jones and Neary (1984) give the central results of Ricardian comparative 
advantage, but when they get to intermediate inputs, they mostly just stress their 
importance and refer the reader to McKenzie (1954) without giving anything in the way 
of results except citing an example in Jones (1980) of how important intermediates can 
be.   35
Appendix B:  Derivation of Equation (26) 
 
Spelling out the vector products as summations and expressing inputs in terms of their 
input-output coefficients, using a bit of manipulation and the definition (7), the value of 
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From (8),  g g a v w / =  for all g for which Xg>0, and thus  g a v w g g ∀ = / ˆ ˆ .  Thus 
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 (A3) 
where again we have mostly manipulated the expressions and reused definitions.  
Combining (A1) and (A3) yields equation (26) in the text.   
 